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1. Introduction 
 
The paper aims to assess the contribution of financialisation to economic performance in the 
European Union (EU). We follow the definition of Epstein (2005) of the process of 
financialisation as “the increasing role of financial motives, financial markets, financial actors and 
financial institutions in the operation of domestic and international economies”. Indeed, the last 
three decades have seen a strong development of financialisation (see e.g. Hein et al., 2016). 
Meanwhile the evolution of economic performance has been uneven, not only in the EU but 
also in other developed countries and emerging nations. Linking the development of 
financialisation to economic performance has long been a mainstream view though (e.g. 
Levine, 2005). The argument according to which financialisation was positively related to 
economic growth and welfare has been key to foster reforms of the financial system. In this 
respect, the mainstream view promoted financial deregulation: a more liberalised system 
was meant to enhance savings (e.g. via the development of innovative financial products) 
and investment (e.g. via new financing opportunities and lower capital prices). 
  
The global financial crisis has modified the mainstream view. Philippon and Reshef (2013) 
argue that “the relationship between the size of the financial sector and income is complex, that most 
of the rise in living standards from 1870 was obtained with less financial output and a smaller share 
of income spent on finance than what is observed after 1980. It also seems that at the current height of 
development, the relationship between financial output and income per capita may have changed”. 
However, the mainstream view has not entirely vanished and has grounded the promotion 
of macroprudential policies. The extension of bank capital buffers (e.g. capital requirements) 
and new mandates attributed to central banks to supervise and control commercial banks 
are not orthogonal to the former view. They assume that the link between financialisation 
and economic performance is not linear: above some thresholds, the relationship would 
change sign but below the thresholds, the mainstream view would remain valid.  
 
The implementation of macroprudential policies which remain grounded on the mainstream 
view is important for a discussion about the future of capitalism and financialisation. As 
they currently stand, macroprudential policies pave the way for minor changes to the 
financial and banking systems, if any. The introduction of some binding ratios (e.g. solvency 
risk, liquidity risk) does not change the very nature of bank activities and does not limit 
financial innovations in the shadow banking sector which remains mostly unregulated. 
Besides, the US administration’s willingness to review the Dodd-Frank Act is a strong signal 
in favour of a return to the status quo which prevailed before the global financial crisis in 
both banking and financial sectors. This paper aims to show that the empirical foundations 
of the mainstream view are fragile. It also aims to highlight the channels through which 
financialisation influences the economy.  
 
To investigate the empirical relevance of the mainstream view, we measure financialisation 
with private credit to GDP and add two measures of banking sector fragility: the ratio of 
credit to deposits and the ratio of bank capital to assets. These two variables capture two 
different features of banks’ balance sheets. The first one embeds the difference in maturity 
between assets and liabilities whereas the second one sheds light on the leverage ratio (the 
inverse of the capital to assets ratio). We test the impact of these variables on different 
measures of economic performance: the growth rates of GDP per capita, consumption per 
capita, investment and inequality. We restrict our attention to EU countries. Our findings 
show that credit has no effect on economic performance. However, the potential fragility of 
the banking sector measured by the ratio of credit to deposits decreases GDP per capita and 
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contributes to increasing inequality whereas the ratio of capital to assets has a negative 
impact on GDP per capita growth through its negative effect on investment, in countries 
with the lowest GDP per capita levels. We also look at the impact of some market-based 
measures of financialisation and of some measures of the side effects of excessive 
financialisation, like greater volatility, non-performing loans or more recurrent banking 
crises. The market-based variables do not impact GDP per capita growth, whereas the latter 
variables have a clear negative impact. 
 
The rest of the paper is organised as follows. Section 2 reviews the literature. Section 3 
presents the empirical method and the data. In section 4, we present and discuss the results. 
In section 5, we conclude with some policy recommendations about de- and re-
financialisation. 
 
2. Financialisation and Economic Performance: a literature review 
 
Opposing views emerged from the literature on the links between finance and economic 
performance. The main arguments are exposed in Levine (2005), Ang (2008), Sawyer (2014), 
Cournède and Denk (2015) and Creel, Hubert and Labondance (2015). On the one hand, 
credit is found to be determinant in the process of economic development. The literature 
often recalls the Schumpeterian view that entrepreneurs need credit to finance their 
innovations. Banks and financial markets are then viewed as facilitators. On the other hand, 
finance development appears to respond to economic growth. With economic expansion, 
firms and households are more likely to demand financial services. According to both views, 
the finance-growth relationship is constrained by structural determinants such as the 
historical level of debt, the legal environment or the level of economic development.  
 
Advocates of the positive role of finance highlight that the development of finance induces a 
better allocation of resources, mobilizes savings, can reduce risks and facilitates transactions 
via lower transaction costs (Beck, 2015). Consequently, the financial sector is viewed as a 
lubricant for the economy, ensuring the emergence of innovative firms. The liberalisation of 
the banking and financial system emerges as a means to increase the quantity and quality of 
investment, in line with the arguments of McKinnon (1973) and Shaw (1973) against the 
“financial repression” stemming from government restrictions on the banking system. 
Quoting Sawyer (2014), “an increase in private capital flows would raise capital stock, productivity 
and investment, along with economic growth and employment. All these increase efficiency and 
policy discipline”.  
 
In contrast a growing number of studies shows that the link between finance and economic 
growth has been either exaggerated (Stiglitz, 2000; Rodrik and Subramanian, 2009) or 
misleading (Arestis, 2006). Arestis argues that the finance-economic growth nexus draws too 
much on the availability of savings and not enough on the availability of productive 
investment opportunities. The transition from “financial repression” to “financial 
liberalisation” generates an increase in the interest rate; the rise in interest rate certainly 
makes savings more attractive, and stimulates it; but the same rise in interest rate is also 
expected to reduce the demand for investment. The idea that financial liberalisation will 
lead to more investment and higher economic growth assumes that the sensitivity of 
investment to interest rates is very low and the sensitivity of savings to interest rates is high. 
The empirical literature cited by Sawyer (2014) does not validate this assumption.  
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Another argument has been put to the forth. De Gregorio and Guidotti (1995) argue that the 
link between finance and economic growth is tenuous or even non-existent in the developed 
countries and explain it by a threshold effect: once a certain level of economic wealth has 
been reached, the financial sector makes only a marginal contribution to the efficiency of 
investment. It abandons its role as a facilitator of economic growth in favour of its own 
growth. Banking and financial groups thus emerge and are “too big to fail”, enabling them 
to take excessive risk since they know it will most certainly be mutualised by public 
authorities’ interventions. Their fragility rapidly transmits to other financial and non-
financial corporations, hence to the real economy. The subprime crisis is a good illustration 
of the magnitude of correlation and contagion across financial markets. Also in this spirit of 
“finance growth for itself”, Godechot (2006) has shown that the rise of bonuses in the finance 
industry was disconnected from efficiency arguments. He depicted it as a “hold-up”: 
bonuses were obtained under the threat of quitting a bank with the team of traders and 
moving to a competitor.  
 
Until recently, the empirical literature has kept on highlighting a positive relationship 
between financial development and economic growth (Bumann et al., 2013), drawing on 
cross-country, time series or panel studies. 
 
Cross-country studies generally find a positive effect of finance on economic performance 
with the notable exception of Ram (1999). King and Levine (1993) show that financial 
development indicators are positively associated with capital accumulation, total factor 
productivity growth and GDP growth. Focusing on stock markets, Demirgüç-Kunt and 
Maksimovic (1998) and Levine and Zervos (1998) conclude that liquid stock markets are 
positively related to GDP growth. These cross-country studies suffer from severe limitations 
though. Most of them intend to quantify whether finance affects economic performance, 
neglecting the reverse causality. To deal with this endogeneity bias, they use instrumental 
variables, but as demonstrated by Ahmed (1998), this technique is not robust when data are 
averaged over decades, which is usually the case in these studies. Another limit of cross-
country analyses is the grouping of countries that are heterogeneous. This issue is 
highlighted by Ram (1999) who shows that after defining subgroups into his sample, an 
important parametric heterogeneity is observed. This is due to the fact that the link between 
finance and economic performance is mainly determined by the financial structures, the 
legal environment, the preferences and the policies implemented in each country (Arestis 
and Demetriades, 1997; Demirgüç-Kunt and Maksimovic, 1998).  
 
Time-series studies developed to counter the above-mentioned limitations. Arestis and 
Demetriades (1997) compare the finance-GDP growth link in Germany and in the United 
States. In Germany they find a relationship from finance development to real GDP, whereas 
the reverse causal pattern runs for the United States. Xu (2000) also provides evidence of 
heterogeneity across countries. Arestis et al. (2001) compare the influence of banks and stock 
markets across five developed countries. Their results show that both promote GDP growth, 
and also suggest that banks’ contribution is stronger than the stock markets’. Moreover, they 
point out that stock markets’ volatility has negative effects in Japan, France and the United 
Kingdom. It is worth acknowledging here that studies with time-series data use relatively 
small samples; consequently, they have to keep explanatory variables to a minimum and 
may therefore be subjected to an omitted variable bias.  
 
To address these issues and combine the benefits of cross-country analysis with those of 
time dimension, the literature moved to dynamic panel estimations. Most panel studies 
conclude that financial development has a positive effect on economic performance, e.g. 
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Beck et al. (2000), Rioja and Valev (2004), Rousseau and Wachtel (2000), Beck and Levine 
(2004) and Rajan and Zingales (1998) with industry-level data. Beck and Levine (2004), using 
dynamic panel data estimation, developed an empirical methodology based on Arellano and 
Bond (1991) that intends to take care of the endogeneity bias. They explain GDP per capita 
growth by means of the usual variables of the endogenous growth theory (i.e. the initial 
GDP per capita, the accumulation of human capital over the average years of education, 
government consumption, trade openness and inflation). Then they add to their model 
credit to the private sector and the turnover ratio as proxies of financial depth. They find 
that financial development impacts positively GDP growth. The turnover ratio and credit to 
the private sector are both significant suggesting that they complement each other.  
 
Nevertheless, the main conclusion that finance improves growth can be moderated. 
Calderon and Liu (2003) find that financial development generally leads to economic 
growth, but they show that the causality from economic growth to financial development 
coexists. They also find that the finance-growth link is more active in developing countries 
than in developed ones and that the longer the sample, the larger the effect of financial 
development. Loayza and Ranciere (2006) highlight that financial deepening has contrasting 
effects. It influences positively growth in the long run but a negative effect can be identified 
in the short run. Fink et al. (2009) show empirically that the finance-growth nexus depends 
on the country’s stage of development and on the segment (credit, stock, bond) of the 
financial market. Cournède and Denk (2015) show that bank credit and economic growth 
have a negative relationship whereas stock market capitalisation and economic growth have 
a positive one. Further investigation by the authors explains the first relationship by some 
composition effects (e.g. quality of credit, household vs. corporate credit). Prochniak and 
Wasiak (2017) show mixed results for a subsample of EU countries or a group of OECD 
countries: the growth of bank credit drives economic growth, but the level of bank credit has 
a negative impact. Moreover, Denk and Cournède (2015) show that higher bank credit (or 
stock market capitalisation) fuels income inequality. Finally, Barradas (2017) shows that 
financialisation in the EU contributed quite substantially to the slowdown of real private 
investment before the global financial crisis. His indicator of financialisation does not draw 
on bank credit, but on the financial receipts and payments of non-financial corporations.  
 
In an attempt to reconcile the diverging views expressed in the literature, Arcand et al. 
(2015) postulate a nonlinear relationship between finance and economic growth. They 
extend Beck and Levine (2004)’s explanatory variables by introducing the square of credit to 
the private sector. They show that the relationship between economic growth and private 
sector credit is positive, but the relationship between economic growth and the square of 
private sector credit (that is to say, the effect of credit to the private sector when it is at a 
high level) is negative. Taken together, these two factors indicate a concave relationship 
between economic growth and credit to the private sector: the relationship is positive up to a 
certain level of financial depth, and beyond a threshold, the effect of financial depth 
becomes negative. According to the different specifications estimated by Arcand et al. 
(2015), the threshold (as a percentage of GDP) lies between 80% and 100% of credit to the 
private sector. Cecchetti and Kharroubi (2012) come to similar results and make clear that 
these thresholds should not be viewed as targets, but more like “extrema” that might be 
reached only in times of crisis. In “normal” times, it would be better that private debt levels 
are lower so as to give the economies some leeway in times of crisis. Sahay et al. (2015) reach 
a similar bell-shaped relationship between financial development and economic growth in 
emerging economies. Gambacorta et al. (2014) find some non-linearities between finance and 
growth and study the incidence of the structure of finance: they show that during financial 
crises, bank-oriented economies are more severely hit than market-oriented ones. Law and 
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Singh (2014) use a dynamic panel threshold method and also show non-linearities in a panel 
of developed and developing countries. To explain non-linearities, Aghion et al. (2005) and 
Fung (2009) argue that financial development helps catch-up the productivity frontier; for 
countries close to the frontier, positive effects from financial depth are limited or 
nonexistent. Philippon (2010) argues that the financial system grows faster than the real 
economy, with the consequence that young talents are more attracted by the financial sector 
than by the nonfinancial one. Beck et al. (2012) insist on the fact that finance growth effect 
stems from firms rather than households. However, in developed countries, financial 
deepening originates from more households’ lending. This may explain the weakness of the 
finance effect in high-income countries. 
 
Beyond questions of non-linearity, finance can also have intrinsic negative effects. Indeed, 
liquidity and maturity transformation from deposit and savings to long-term investments 
can improve economic performance but can also be damaging. Deregulation and 
information asymmetries have encouraged banks to take more risks in recent years. 
Combined with financial deepening, it led to excessive lending, and reinforced bubbles that 
create conditions for banking and financial fragility. The failure of financial institutions can 
have strong negative externalities. Laeven and Valencia (2012) show that banking crises tend 
to have larger real effects in advanced economies. Output losses are driven by larger 
banking systems which impact deeply on the whole economy.  
 
The literature provides mixed results about the finance-growth nexus, and since the global 
financial crisis, studies about the effect of financialisation on economic performance have 
been progressively complemented with indicators of banking or financial fragility (liquidity 
ratio, maturity transformation, bank crises).  
 
3. The empirical strategy 
 
3.1. Data 
 
We use annual data between 1991 and 2014 for all EU countries. These data came from the 
World Bank, precisely from the Global Financial Development Database (GFDD) and the 
World Development Indicators (WDI). Table A in the appendix presents a description of the 
data and Table B their descriptive statistics. 
 
The main indicator of economic performance is the real GDP per capita growth rate, as 
common in the literature dedicated to the real impact of finance. Following Stiglitz et al. 
(2009), we also investigate the impact on the growth rates of household consumption per 
capita and of investment, measured with real gross fixed capital formation. Finally, we also 
analyse the impact of financialisation on inequality measured by the Gini index.  
 
To quantify the development of financialisation, we use an indicator of financial depth that 
is measured in a similar fashion in all EU countries. Beck and Levine (2004) use total credit 
to the private sector from deposit banks. This measure was certainly relevant until the 1990s, 
but now it is more accurate to use total credit to the private sector by deposit banks and 
other financial institutions. Figure 1 presents the evolution of private credit in the EU since 
1991. We observe that the growth of private credit has stopped since the crisis. However its 
level is relatively high in 2014 at levels similar to its pre-crisis level.  
 
[Insert figure 1 here] 
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We also use proxies of the potential fragility of the financialisation process which give some 
indication on risks taken by banks. The ratio of bank credit to bank deposits and the ratio of 
bank capital to bank assets provide complementary information on the structure of the 
banking sector and its resilience to negative shocks. The ratio of bank credit to bank deposit 
highlights the maturity risk: liabilities are short whereas assets are long. The ratio of capital 
to assets is the inverse of the leverage ratio of banks and is indicative of the sensitiveness of 
banks to balance sheet risks. 
 
[Insert figure 2 here] 
 
The process of financialisation can also be measured on financial markets. Figures 2 and 3 
present respectively the evolution of stock market capitalization and the evolution of 
securitization in the EU countries. One common feature between private credit, stock market 
capitalization and private debt securities is the substantial heterogeneity across the EU. 
Financialisation measured on financial markets also shows much more volatility than when 
it is measured through bank intermediation.  
 
[Insert figure 3 here] 
 
An additional step of our empirical investigation uses proxies of banking and financial 
instability to investigate whether they impinge on the relationship between financialisation 
and economic performance. We use bank crisis dummies, non-performing loans, volatility 
index and a composite index of systemic stress (CISS) to measure to what extent 
characteristics of bank instability affect economic performance beyond financialisation. 
 
[Insert figure 4 here] 
 
Last, figure 4 shows a scatter plot of the real GDP per capita growth rate and credit to GDP. 
Though the plot cannot give any indication on the causality if any between both variables, it 
shows that their relationship is unclear. 
 
3.2. Methodology 
 
Following Beck and Levine (2004), we estimate the relationship between finance and GDP 
growth using the GMM estimator developed by Arellano and Bond (1991). The regression 
equation can be described in the following form: 
ݕ௜,௧ =  ߚݕ௜,௧ିଵ +  ߛ ௜ܺ,௧ +  ߜܼ௜,௧ +  ߝ௜,௧                       (1) 
 
where subscripts i and t represent respectively the country and time period, ݕ௜,௧  is the 
dependent variable of economic performance, ݕ௜,௧ିଵ represents its lagged value. ௜ܺ,௧ is a set 
of explanatory variables typically used in this literature such as trade openness, the inflation 
rate, and government consumption. ܼ௜,௧ includes explanatory variables directly related to 
financialisation and ߝ௜,௧  is the error term that includes country-specific and time-specific 
effects. 
 
Some econometric issues may arise. First, variables included in ௜ܺ,௧ and ܼ௜,௧ may not be fully 
exogenous, and causality may run in both directions. Second, the country fixed-effects 
contained in the error term can be correlated with the explanatory variables. Third, the panel 
dataset has a relatively short time dimension and a large country dimension. These three 
issues can be addressed with the two-step GMM estimator proposed by Arellano and Bond 
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(1991) in which the set of instrumental variables is constituted by the lagged values of all 
explanatory variables, including ݕ௜,௧ିଵ . Moreover, Arellano and Bond (1991) rewrite 
equation (1) in first difference: 
Δݕ௜,௧ =  ߚΔݕ௜,௧ିଵ +  ߛΔ ௜ܺ,௧ +  ߜΔܼ௜,௧ +  Δߝ௜,௧                             (2) 
 
By transforming the regressors in first difference, the country fixed-effect is removed, but a 
new bias is potentially introduced: the new error term can be correlated with the lagged 
dependent variable. Under the assumption that the error term is not serially correlated and 
that the explanatory variables are weakly exogenous, Arellano and Bond (1991) define the 
following procedure. In the first step of their GMM estimator, error terms are assumed to be 
homoskedastic and independent over time and across countries. Then, in the second step 
residuals obtained in the first step are used to build a consistent estimate of the variance-
covariance matrix. Assumptions of independence and homoskedasticity are then relaxed, 
making the two-step estimator asymptotically more efficient than the first-step one. We 
obtain robust standard errors using the Windmeijer (2005) finite sample correction. The 
assumption of no serial correlation in the error terms is crucial for the consistency of the 
GMM estimator.1  
 
Our estimation strategy differs from earlier ones in that we do not use average data in our 
dynamic panel estimations. Beck and Levine (2004) and Arcand et al. (2012) use average 
data in order to quantify the long-term relationship between finance and economic 
performance. Their data are averaged over 5-year periods to disentangle credit cycle effects. 
We do not follow this assumption for two reasons and use instead annual data. First, 
business cycles measured by the National Bureau of Economic research (NBER) in the 
United States and by the Center for Economic Policy Research (CEPR) in Europe are longer 
than five years. Measures of financial cycles (Drehmann et al., 2012) show that financial 
cycles have a much lower frequency than traditional business cycles. Their average duration 
has increased since the 1980s and is now around 20 years, making 5-year average data 
unable to fit the duration of these cycles. Second, we think that it is worth investigating not 
only the long-term effects of finance on economic performance but also its short-term effects: 
the use of average data disregards the latter. 
 
4. Empirical results 
 
4.1. Baseline 
 
We assess the link between the size and risks embedded in banking activities on the one 
hand and economic performance on the other hand. Ratios of credit to GDP, credit to 
deposit and capital to assets capture different complementary information (financial depth, 
maturity risk, balance sheet risk) about banks. We test their impact on four measures of 
economic performance. Table 1 reports the baseline results of our estimations. We find that 
credit has no effect on economic performance in the EU since 1991, independently of the 
level of risks for which we control and of the measure of economic performance chosen. 
 
[Insert table 1 here] 
 
                                                     
1 The use of a large number of instruments may lead to over-identification. In order to avoid this, we use 
variables in level as instruments only up to three lags instead of using all their history. Using Sargan tests, we do 
not reject the null hypothesis that our instruments are valid. 
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The fragility of the process of financialisation measured by the ratio of bank credit to bank 
deposit has a negative impact on GDP per capita and contributes to increasing inequality. In 
contrast, the capital to assets ratio which captures the inverse of the leverage ratio has a 
negative impact on GDP per capita growth possibly through its effect on investment. This 
latter result suggests that the higher the leverage ratio, the higher the economic 
performance. It seems to entail that taking more risk has positive effects on growth. This 
outcome is being triggered by the impact on private investment, whereas the impact on 
consumption is null. The positive impact of one particular dimension of financialisation (the 
ratio of capital to assets) on private investment seems at odds with Stockhammer (2004) and 
Barradas (2017) who show that financialisation can hurt capital accumulation. Such is the 
case (depending on the econometric specification) in France, the UK and the US in 
Stockhammer (2014) and for EU countries between 1995 and 2013 in Barradas (2017). The 
underlying arguments for their results are described in Hein and Dodig (2015). Two points 
must be stressed. First the measures of financialisation used by Stockhammer (2004) and 
Barradas (2017) are different from ours. Stockhammer uses the interest and dividend income 
of the non-financial business sector divided by its value added that he labels the “rentiers’ 
share of non-financial businesses”, whereas Barradas uses the financial receipts and 
financial payments of non-financial corporations. Second and more importantly, we show in 
the following section that the result that capital to assets has a negative impact on economic 
performance is driven by some country characteristics and is therefore state-dependent.  
 
4.2. Geographical subsamples 
 
We assess whether our baseline results are driven by institutional features or non-linearities 
(more precisely, a threshold effect) according to the level of GDP per capita or the level of 
financialisation. We estimate the impact of the three variables of financialisation according 
to whether countries are among the founding members of the Eurozone and whether they 
were part of the latest waves of EU enlargement. We also estimate the impact of 
financialisation according to the level of GDP per capita and according to the level of credit 
to GDP. Table 2 reports the results of the dynamic panel estimations of equation (2) on these 
subsamples. In specification (1), the Eurozone is constituted by the 12 first members of the 
Eurozone. In specification (2) New Europe is constituted by the 13 latest members of the EU. 
In specifications (3) and (4), the subsamples are constituted of the countries above and below 
the median of the GDP per capita levels respectively. In specifications (5) and (6), the 
subsamples comprised the countries above and below the median of credit to GDP levels 
respectively.  
 
[Insert table 2 here] 
 
These estimations confirm the result that credit to GDP has no significant impact on the 
GDP per capita growth rate. The ratio of credit to deposits has a negative effect on the 
economic performance of Eurozone countries but is not significant at conventional levels. It 
has no impact on other subsamples. The ratio of capital to assets has a negative effect on 
GDP growth in most subsamples though it is not statistically significant. However, the 
pattern of the effects when looking at subsamples based on GDP per capita levels is clear: 
the effect of capital to assets is positive though non-significant in countries with higher GDP 
per capita and the effect is negative and significant in countries with lower GDP per capita. 
It suggests that balance sheet risks captured by the leverage ratio would be harmful on 
growth in richer countries and would have positive impact for poorer countries, possibly 
because they are in a process of convergence. 
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4.3. Including market variables 
 
We then investigate whether variables measuring the level of market financialisation rather 
than bank financialisation matter for economic performance. We alternatively test the 
turnover ratio, which is a measure of liquidity or depth of financial markets, the ratio of the 
stock market capitalization to GDP and the amount of domestic private debt securities as a 
share of GDP. These variables are introduced in the empirical model described by equation 
(2) alongside the main three variables of financialisation. The objective is to explore whether 
the previous results hold or whether they suffer an omitted variable bias so that the effect of 
financialisation is actually different. Estimates are presented in Table 3. The effect of credit 
to GDP on economic performance is still null while the effects of the two financialisation risk 
variables hold. In addition, none of the market financialisation variables contribute 
significantly to GDP growth. 
 
[Insert table 3 here] 
 
4.4. Side effects 
 
Finally, we test whether different variables capturing the potential side effects of excessive 
financialisation influence economic performance. With the growing process of 
financialisation, one observes an increase in financial instability and crises. In addition to the 
financialisation variables, we first include in equation (2) the bank crisis dummy defined by 
Laeven and Valencia (2012). Second, we test the impact of non-performing loans. This 
variable measures the process of lending ever more to ever riskier agents. Third, we evaluate 
the effects of stock price volatility and of an index of systemic risk, the CISS, computed by 
the ECB. Results are presented in Table 4. They show that our main result that 
financialisation has no positive effect on the growth of GDP per capita is robust and does 
not suffer from an omitted variable bias. Moreover, we observe that the four variables 
capturing the potential side effects of excessive financialisation have a negative and 
significant effect on GDP growth. The most significant effect goes through non-performing 
loans on total credit and it is interesting to note that in this specification (column 2) the 
negative effect of capital to assets vanishes. This suggests that when taking into account the 
quality of the credit supplied to the economy, the level of capital to assets is no longer a 
determinant of economic performance. 
 
[Insert table 4 here] 
 
5. Conclusion 
 
This paper assesses the link between financialisation and economic performance. We enlarge 
the scope for so-called economic performance beyond GDP to consumption, investment and 
inequality. We complement the use of credit to GDP to measure financialisation to two 
variables that capture some underlying characteristics of financialisation. We restrict our 
attention to the EU countries which, despite their differences, share a common financial 
framework. Finally, we also analyse the impact of market financialisation and of the 
potential side effects of excessive financialisation on economic performance.  
 
We show that credit to GDP has no effect on economic performance and that credit to 
deposits together with the side effects associated with excessive financialisation affects 
negatively GDP per capita growth. In this case, the return to the pre-global-financial-crisis’ 
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situation with insufficient regulation may lead to lower economic growth. Some may argue 
that the frequency of crises is ultimately high, except during the post-World-War-2 period 
until the first oil price shock (see the databases of Laeven and Valencia, 2012; Reinhart and 
Rogoff, 2010; or Schularick and Taylor, 2012). If a situation in which economies are crippled 
with frequent crises is the “new normal”, re-endorsing the mainstream view is “normal” as 
well. However, the next time may be different. The depth and length of the previous crisis in 
the European Union have been sizable and an early return to recession may have a larger 
financial and economic impact.  
 
Preventing the next crisis is a crucial challenge in this respect. We argue that adopting the 
appropriate view on the link between financialisation and economic performance is pivotal 
to avoid detrimental policies. It is ever more important if one extends the analysis to long-
term issues about social and environmental sustainability. Backing financialisation because it 
is supposed to boost short-run indicators of performance may well produce 
counterproductive results: short-run growth may produce costs to future development, via 
fewer renewable resources and higher negative spillovers (e.g. Greenhalgh, 2005). But 
backing financialisation although it disrupts short-run indicators of performance may reduce 
the willingness and incentives to take better care of long-run sustainability objectives. 
Higher inequality in the short run, under financialisation and lower economic growth, do 
not facilitate the feeling of emergency of achieving the ecological transition by governments, 
firms and households (e.g. Laurent, 2011; Motesharrei et al., 2014). Our results thus call for 
regulating the banking sector activity as financialisation and financial instability are 
detrimental to growth and inequality.  
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Figure 1: Private Credit (in % of GDP) in the European Union 
 
Note: This figure presents a box plot of the Private credit variable distributional 
characteristics each year from 1991 to 2014. The “box” represents the inter-quartile 
range. The median marks the mid-point of the data and is shown by the line that divides 
the box into two parts. The upper and lower whiskers show the upper and the lower 
adjacent values. Outsides values are also represented. Source: GFDD. 
 
 
Figure 2: Stock Market Capitalization (in % of GDP) in the European Union 
 
Note: This figure presents a box plot of the stock market capitalization variable 
distributional characteristics each year from 1991 to 2014. The “box” represents the inter-
quartile range. The median marks the mid-point of the data and is shown by the line that 
divides the box into two parts. The upper and lower whiskers show the upper and the 
lower adjacent values. Outsides values are also represented. Source: GFDD. 
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Figure 3: Private debt securities (in % of GDP) in the European Union 
 
Note: This figure presents a box plot of the private debt securities variable distributional 
characteristics each year from 1991 to 2014. The “box” represents the inter-quartile 
range. The median marks the mid-point of the data and is shown by the line that divides 
the box into two parts. The upper and lower whiskers show the upper and the lower 
adjacent values. Outsides values are also represented. Source: GFDD. 
 
 
Figure 4: Private Credit (in % of GDP) and GDP per capita growth rate (in %) 
 
Note: This figure presents a scatter plot. Each point represents for a country the GDP 
growth rate per capita and the level of private credit for a specific year. Sources: GFDD and 
WDI. 
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Table 1: Baseline 
 
Note: This table reports the results of a set of dynamic panel estimations aimed to estimate the effect of 
financialisation on four economic performances. All regressions are estimated with annual data from 
1991 to 2014 using the first-differenced GMM estimator. Control variables are: the initial level of 
economic performance, inflation, trade openness and government consumption. Robust (Windmeijer) 
standard errors are in brackets. * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p < 0.01. Data sources: GFDD and WDI. 
 
 
  
(1) (2) (3) (4)
GDP/Cap. 
growth rate
Cons./Cap. 
growth rate
Invest.      
growth rate
Inequality 
growth rate
Credit to GDP -0.012 -0.027 0.016 0.001
[0.03] [0.05] [0.10] [0.00]
 Credit to Deposits -0.068* -0.059 -0.245 0.002***
[0.04] [0.04] [0.16] [0.00]
 Capital to Assets -1.764*** -0.729 -2.231*** 0.01
[0.47] [0.48] [0.85] [0.01]
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Sargan test p-val 0.99 0.99 0.99 0.99
AR1 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.07
AR2 0.54 0.74 0.99 0.79
Countries 27 27 27 25
N 280 280 280 117
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Table 2: Geographical subsamples 
 
Note: This table reports the results of a set of dynamic panel estimations aimed to estimate the effect of financialisation on 
the GDP growth rate per capita according to geographical subsambles. In specification (1), the Eurozone is constituted by 
the 12 first members of the Eurozone. In specification (2) New Europe is constituted by the 13 latest member of the EU. In 
specifications (3) to (6), we present results for geographical subsamples according to the median of the GDP growth rate 
per capita (above in specification (3) and below in (4)) and to the median of Private credit (above in specification (5) and 
below in (6)). We define these medians in 2004. All regressions are estimated with annual data from 1991 to 2014 using 
the first-differenced GMM estimator. Control variables are: the initial level of economic performance, inflation, trade 
openness and government consumption. Robust (Windmeijer) standard errors are in brackets. * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p < 
0.01. Data sources: GFDD and WDI. 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Eurozone New Europe
above       
median GDP
below      
median GDP
above       
median credit
below      
median credit
Credit to GDP 0.204 -0.184 -0.039 -0.211 -0.017 -0.078
[0.15] [0.23] [0.09] [0.23] [0.03] [0.21]
 Credit to Deposits -0.296 0.157 0.043 0.048 0.01 0.015
[0.27] [0.17] [0.09] [0.14] [0.07] [0.11]
 Capital to Assets -1.391 -3.143 0.386 -3.950** -0.332 -1.037
[1.50] [2.38] [1.66] [1.91] [0.68] [2.43]
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Sargan test p-val 0.99 0.99 0.99 0.99 0.99 0.99
AR1 0.86 0.27 0.33 0.16 0.73 0.04
AR2 0.22 0.26 0.01 0.57 0.04 0.19
Countries 12 13 14 14 14 14
N 136 123 145 135 158 122
GDP/Cap.          
growth rate
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Table 3: Including market variables 
 
Note: This table reports the results of a set of dynamic panel estimations aimed 
to estimate the effect of financialisation on GDP growth rate per capita. All 
regressions are estimated with annual data from 1991 to 2014 using the first-
differenced GMM estimator. Control variables are: the initial level of economic 
performance, inflation, trade openness and government consumption. Robust 
(Windmeijer) standard errors are in brackets. * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p < 0.01. 
Data sources: GFDD and WDI. 
 
  
Credit to GDP 0.008 -0.005 -0.004
[0.02] [0.02] [0.02]
 Credit to Deposits -0.068 -0.080* -0.003
[0.05] [0.05] [0.06]
 Capital to Assets -1.502** -0.981* 0.13
[0.63] [0.54] [1.41]
Turnover ratio -0.014
[0.02]
Stock Market Cap. 0.015
[0.03]
Securities to GDP 0.018
[0.05]
Controls Yes Yes Yes
Sargan test p-val 0.99 0.99 0.99
AR1 0.10 0.32 0.59
AR2 0.30 0.25 0.32
Countries 27 27 22
N 259 259 162
GDP/Cap.          
growth rate
(3)(2)(1)
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Table 4: Side effects of excessive financialisation 
 
Note: This table reports the results of a set of dynamic panel estimations aimed to 
estimate the effect of financialisation on GDP growth rate per capita. All regressions are 
estimated with annual data from 1991 to 2014 using the first-differenced GMM 
estimator. Control variables are: the initial level of economic performance, inflation, 
trade openness and government consumption. Robust (Windmeijer) standard errors are 
in brackets. * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p < 0.01. Data sources: GFDD and WDI. 
 
  
Credit to GDP -0.008 -0.033 -0.001 0.016
[0.03] [0.02] [0.01] [0.04]
 Credit to Deposits -0.015 -0.028 -0.036 -0.039
[0.06] [0.04] [0.04] [0.04]
 Capital to Assets -1.201 -0.485 -1.526*** -1.382***
[1.03] [0.32] [0.40] [0.38]
Bank crisis dummy -1.839*
[0.98]
Non Perf. Loans -0.318***
[0.08]
Volatility -0.109**
[0.05]
CISS -8.195*
[4.19]
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Sargan test p-val 0.99 0.99 0.99 0.99
AR1 0.11 0.12 0.05 0.01
AR2 0.99 0.07 0.71 0.45
Countries 27 27 27 26
N 205 259 270 261
GDP/Cap.         
Growth rate
(4)(3)(2)(1)
20 
 
APPENDIX 
Table A: Data Description and Sources 
 
 
  
Data Definition Source Frequency
GDP/Cap. growth rate
Annual percentage growth rate of GDP per capita based on constant local 
currency. Aggregates are based on constant 2010 U.S. dollars. 
WDI Annual
Consumption/Cap. growth rate
Annual percentage growth of household final consumption expenditure based 
on constant local currency. Aggregates are based on constant 2010 U.S. dollars. 
WDI Annual
Investment growth rate
Annual percentage growth of gross capital formation consists of outlays on 
additions to the fixed assets of the economy plus net changes in the level of 
inventories. 
WDI Annual
Inequality 
Gini index measures the extent to which the distribution of income among 
individuals or households within an economy deviates from a perfectly equal 
distribution. The Gini index measures the area between the Lorenz curve and a 
hypothetical line of absolute equality, expressed as a percentage of the 
maximum area under the line. A Gini index of 0 represents perfect equality, 
while an index of 100 implies perfect inequality.
WDI Annual
Credit to GDP Private credit by deposit money banks and other financial institutions to GDP. GFDD Annual
Credit to Deposits
The financial resources provided to the private sector by domestic money 
banks as a share of total deposits. Domestic money banks comprise 
commercial banks and other financial institutions that accept transferable 
deposits, such as demand deposits. Total deposits include demand, time and 
saving deposits in deposit money banks.
GFDD Annual
Capital to Assets
Ratio of bank capital and reserves to total assets. Capital and reserves include 
funds contributed by owners, retained earnings, general and special reserves, 
provisions, and valuation adjustments. Total assets include all nonfinancial 
and financial assets.
GFDD Annual
Deposit Banks' assets Total assets held by deposit money banks as a share of GDP. GFDD Annual
Stock Market Capitalization Total value of all listed shares in a stock market as a percentage of GDP. GFDD Annual
Securities to GDP
Total amount of domestic private debt securities (amount outstanding) issued 
in domestic markets as a share of GDP. It covers data on long-term bonds and 
notes, commercial paper and other short-term notes.
GFDD Annual
Turnover
Total value of shares traded during the period divided by the average market 
capitalization for the period.
GFDD Annual
Bank Crisis
Laeven and Valencia (2012) Dummy variable for the presence of banking crisis 
(1=banking crisis, 0=none)
GFDD Annual
Non Perf. Loans
Ratio of defaulting loans (payments of interest and principal past due by 90 
days or more) to total gross loans (total value of loan portfolio). The loan 
amount recorded as nonperforming includes the gross value of the loan as 
recorded on the balance sheet, not just the amount that is overdue.
GFDD Annual
Volatility
Stock price volatility is the average of the 360-day volatility of the national 
stock market index.
GFDD Annual
CISS (composite indicator of 
systemic stress)
Index comprising the five most important segments of a financial system: 
bank and non-bank financial intermediaries sector, money markets, securities 
markets and foreign exchange markets.
ECB
Weekly 
aggregated to 
annual
Trade
Trade in services is the sum of service exports and imports  divided by the 
value of GDP, all in current U.S. dollars.
WDI Annual
Inflation
Inflation as measured by the consumer price index reflects the annual 
percentage change in the cost to the average consumer of acquiring a basket of 
goods and services that may be fixed or changed at specified intervals.
WDI Annual
Government consumption
General government final consumption expenditure (formerly general 
government consumption) includes all government current expenditures for 
purchases of goods and services (including compensation of employees). Data 
are in constant 2010 U.S. dollars.
WDI Annual
Economic Performance
Financialisation indicators
Side effects of financialisation
Controls
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Table B: Descriptive statistics 
 
 
 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
GDP/Cap. growth rate 690 2.19 3.71 -14.56 25.64
Consumption/Cap. growth rate 686 2.07 4.23 -24.30 26.75
Investment growth rate 686 3.05 10.76 -54.90 69.36
Inequality 241 0.00 0.05 -0.24 0.38
Credit to GDP 664 76.82 48.81 1.13 311.99
Credit to Deposits 634 114.33 51.73 17.79 367.08
Capital to Assets 398 7.31 2.51 2.70 15.30
Turnover 612 49.75 46.93 0.03 341.24
Stock Market Capitalization 613 47.60 42.35 0.03 249.96
Securities 411 33.05 34.12 0.13 197.13
Bank Crisis 616 0.18 0.39 0 1
Non Perf. Loans 441 5.81 6.30 0.10 44.90
Volatility 553 21.58 9.13 6.87 61.33
CISS 447 0.18 0.18 0.02 0.92
Government consumption 702 19.73 2.96 11.63 28.06
Inflation 703 12.81 77.57 -4.48 1494.68
Trade 702 103.41 58.98 33.98 391.50
Economic Performance
Controls
Side effects of financialisation
Financialisation indicators
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